

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 10 June 1992, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. Roberto García Moritán

(Argentina)

* Re-issued for technical reasons.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 624th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all I should like to perform the pleasant task of extending a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf to Her Excellency the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mrs. Helga Hernes. In doing so, I wish to convey to her my appreciation for her kindness in moving her visit to this plenary meeting, as a result of a change of date requested by some of our colleagues last week. The State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway is well known to us all, since she has contributed to our work on various occasions, the first time in September 1988, shortly after taking up the duties she is still performing today. I am sure the Conference will listen to her statement with special interest. I also wish her a profitable stay in Geneva, at this decisive stage of our negotiations for the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

On the list of speakers for today are the representatives of Norway, Nigeria, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Iraq. I now have pleasure in giving the floor to the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mrs. Helga Hernes.

Mrs. HERNES (Norway): May I first of all say that my delegation is very pleased to see you, Ambassador Moritán, preside over the Conference? This is a critical moment for the CD's efforts to negotiate a CW treaty and your wise guidance will, I am sure, contribute greatly to the success of these efforts. I would also like to express respect for the excellent leadership of Algeria's Ambassador Semichi in his period as President of the Conference. Since I spoke here last time, Ambassador Berasategui has taken over as Secretary-General of the CD, and we are very pleased to see him in this important position. He has often given kind assistance to our delegation in the past.

Once again we are meeting against the backdrop of significant achievements in the field of arms control. The obstacles to ratification and entry into force of the START and CFE treaties have been removed. The entire world community benefits from these developments. The CFE Treaty is a cornerstone of the new European architecture. It epitomizes a qualitatively new stage in European security relations. At the same time, it provides insurance against another build-up of conventional armaments with offensive capabilities. In other words, the CFE Treaty codifies the declared intention of the States parties to live in peace with each other and to refrain from the use of armed force except in response to armed aggression. This is why we welcome the 15 May Tashkent agreement among the States of the former Soviet Union on rights and obligations under the CFE Treaty. As confirmed at the Oslo extraordinary conference of the parties to the Treaty, this agreement provides reassuring evidence of the firm intention of the States concerned to contribute actively and constructively to European security and stability. We welcome this accomplishment in view of the many complex military and political issues intertwined with the question of the redistribution of CFE rights and obligations. Those parties which have not already done so must now ratify the Treaty as soon as possible. Ratification and entry into force in time for

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the 10 July CSCE summit in Helsinki would provide a powerful impetus to further progress in security cooperation among the members of the CSCE community, as would a timely completion of the follow-up CFE IA negotiations.

The 23 May Lisbon agreements on START-related matters are of comparable significance. They pave the way for early ratification and entry into force of this landmark treaty, providing for sizeable cuts in strategic nuclear arms and strengthening strategic stability. This breakthrough was possible only because of the sense of direction and responsibility of the parties concerned, and the untiring efforts of the United States were instrumental in bringing about this positive outcome and should be particularly commended.

The Lisbon agreements will strengthen the non-proliferation regime. We welcome the commitments of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to become non-nuclear-weapon States. We urge these States to negotiate safeguard agreements with IAEA as soon as possible. But like the Tashkent agreement on CFE, the Lisbon agreement is only the first step, albeit a highly important one, and the parties concerned must waste no time in proceeding to consolidation of the 23 May achievements by early ratification and implementation of the START Treaty.

While prospects for further progress in arms control, conventional as well as nuclear, are encouraging, the increasing frequency of conflicts related to ethnic rivalries and minorities issues are a source of growing concern. In this context we need only consider the tragic and cross-border violence in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Similar conflicts, potentially as brutal and ferocious as those in Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh, loom on the horizon. CSCE has a vital role to play in this regard, in cooperation with and drawing upon the resources of other existing institutions, such as the European Community, the Western European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. The option of peace-keeping activities of various kinds should be a key element of the overall conflict prevention and crisis management capability of CSCE. This would be a useful supplement to the peace-keeping role of the United Nations. CSCE should in our view retain overall political guidance and control of any peace-keeping activity carried out under its auspices. Particularly in connection with larger-scale activities, however, CSCE should retain the option of drawing upon the resources and expertise of existing organizations such as NATO and WEU. CSCE does not have the necessary infrastructure, whereas NATO does. At its 4 June ministerial meeting in Oslo, the Alliance declared itself ready to make available to CSCE its resources and expertise in connection with peace-keeping operations, and this important declaration should be followed by a similar statement on the part of the CSCE summit next month.

The Conference on Disarmament has recently made great strides towards a complete treaty text banning the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, as well as the destruction of chemical weapons stocks. My Government expects the treaty to be ready for signature later this year. We wholeheartedly congratulate Ambassador von Wagner of Germany and his team

(Mrs. Hernes, Norway)

for their achievements in producing a complete and balanced draft treaty. The Australian draft text, presented in March this year by Foreign Secretary Evans, has also served to bring the negotiations forward. On the basis of these efforts a final result is now within reach, and this unique opportunity for a CW convention that can gain universal acceptance should not be missed. Norway is strongly committed to early accession to the treaty. However, complicated issues remain to be resolved in the few weeks ahead. In particular, we need to find an acceptable compromise solution as regards the verification regime. All the parties involved must show flexibility on all the outstanding issues. We must not allow our vision of a perfect agreement to prevent us from adopting a good one. We must not waste an historic opportunity because of lack of consensus on a few minor details.

In connection with the preparation of a CW convention, Norway has for the last decade submitted technical studies to the Conference on Disarmament on verification of possible use of CW in the field. We are about to submit the eleventh report in this series, which deals with operating procedures for sampling and sample handling. A programme for training experts and scholars from developing countries in taking samples in the field is now also being offered by Norway. It is believed that the training programme will also be of benefit in the control of insecticides in developing countries.

For many years the achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) has been a central Norwegian foreign policy goal. A total, permanent ban on all nuclear testing is essential in order to halt effectively both the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other important reasons for the discontinuation of all nuclear test explosions are the environmental and health risks associated with underground nuclear explosions. Accidents and venting may occur and could have serious consequences, and this is why my Government is concerned about nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya, which is an archipelago located in a vulnerable Arctic environment. The CD is the appropriate forum to deal with the issue of a nuclear test ban. We regret that it has not yet proved possible to establish a working group on the test ban issue in the CD.

Norway attaches great importance to and takes an active part in the efforts of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to design and test a global seismic network which could monitor a comprehensive nuclear test ban. An up-to-date global seismic network would form an essential part of the verification regime of a CTBT. The large-scale GSETT-2 experiment undertaken by the Group last year will provide an excellent basis for the Group's further work in revising the initial design concepts for such a global network.

We welcome the Russian moratorium on nuclear tests and hope that this unilateral test ban will be continued beyond its present scope. I also welcome the French decision, announced by President Mitterrand on 8 April, to abstain from further testing this year. But the time spans of earlier moratoriums on nuclear test bans have proved to be limited. Experience shows that if such unilateral steps are not followed by other countries, there is

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growing pressure to resume testing. The aim must therefore be to secure a negotiated permanent global test ban. Meanwhile, we urge all nuclear-weapon States to halt their nuclear testing activities.

Some time ago Foreign Minister Stoltenberg took the initiative to prepare an expert report on questions related to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In cooperation with the Norwegian Advisory Council for Arms Control and Disarmament, we invited a group of internationally recognized experts to prepare contributions to the report. The report, which was finalized at a workshop in Oslo in March this year, calls for a comprehensive test-ban treaty by 1995. The concluding chapter of this report, distributed as document CD/1151, states that the reasons usually put forward for continuing nuclear tests are losing credibility and that the environmental effects of continued testing and the dangers of nuclear proliferation are the two overriding issues necessitating a CTB.

There is reason to believe that the non-proliferation regime will be strengthened by a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the only global instrument through which States can make a formal commitment not to acquire or to assist other States in acquiring nuclear weapons. It is especially encouraging to note that a number of States have recently acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty, among them South Africa and the nuclear-weapon State China. France has decided to follow suit. The intention of the new republics in the former Soviet Union to adhere to the NPT is also an important step towards universal adherence to the Treaty. It is now essential that the safeguards control system of IAEA be further strengthened and that the organization be provided with adequate financial resources to maintain a credible level of supervision.

The Gulf war and its aftermath have clearly highlighted the threat to international security posed by the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Control of weapons technology, particularly nuclear technology, is a global concern which is becoming increasingly urgent. The multilateral export control regimes already in place have been established to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. However, proliferation control must also be grounded on regional conflict resolution, crisis prevention, confidence-building and arms control.

In the years to come, the world community should make a significant shift in the allocation of resources, away from armaments and towards development and the protection of our environment. Sustainable development necessitates a reduction of excessive military expenditure.

In recent years major achievements have been made in the area of disarmament. The CFE and START treaties represent cornerstones in this development. The NPT regime has been strengthened. A CW treaty could be a fitting culmination of the arduous efforts of the Conference on Disarmament over many years. It would not, however, make the CD superfluous. There are many important challenges for the CD in the years ahead. Transparency in armaments and the questions of non-proliferation are important issues to

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consider in the future. There is clearly a need for the CD as a multilateral negotiating body. But we also see a need for this Conference to become more efficient. The agenda, which is largely inherited from the past, should be attuned to the most urgent security problems of the day.

We would also argue for an expansion of the CD. Increasing its membership would broaden the political basis for the negotiations and enable it to benefit from the experience and contributions of a larger group of nations. Since 1986 Norway has been the endorsed Western Group candidate for membership, and we continue to hope that the decision to expand the CD can be implemented without further delay.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank Her Excellency the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway for her statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Azikiwe.

Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria): Mr. President, I am pleased to see you, the distinguished representative of Argentina, preside over our work. I am confident that with your vast diplomatic experience and well-known personal abilities, you will successfully discharge your responsibilities in the days ahead. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Semichi of Algeria, for the able manner in which he conducted the work of the Conference during his presidency.

A number of colleagues have left us since I last took the floor. I wish them every success in their future endeavours. Similarly, I would like to welcome our new colleagues who recently joined us - Sir Michael Weston of the United Kingdom and Ambassador Tanaka of Japan. May I also use this opportunity to wish Ambassador Juraj Králík of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic every success in his future endeavours? His constructive contributions to our work are appreciated by all delegations.

We are fortunate to have with us this morning the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mrs. Helga Hernes. My delegation listened with great interest to her important statement.

The first part of my statement today will deal with our work in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The prospects of concluding an effective and verifiable chemical weapons convention are now far more promising. Despite minor differences, there are clear indications that the time is now ripe to get down to the final drafting of the convention. My delegation recalls that the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, last March in a plenary statement introduced a text. Though not an alternative or substitute for the "rolling text", it offered a model for the acceleration of the ongoing negotiations.

Similarly, the consultations conducted by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee during the inter-sessional period have borne out the importance that delegations attach to the early conclusion of a convention.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

My delegation commends the efforts of Ambassador von Wagner in producing working paper 400 for the final phase of the negotiation. Although chemical weapons have become an inescapable part of the human heritage, Nigeria remains committed to the early conclusion of the convention.

We do not assume the pretentious posture that the remaining obstacles can be subjected to simplistic solutions. The international community, however, has the obligation to strive together in resolving the remaining problems. The convention is within reach and a spirit of mutual concession is required on the part of all delegations in ensuring a balanced agreement that would enjoy universal adherence.

The chemical weapons convention is of special significance to Nigeria's nascent chemical industry. The importance we attach to the convention stems from our desire to achieve an agreement consistent with global security concerns, but at the same time guarantees that the development of our chemical industry will not be unduly impeded. In other words, there should be a balance between the security concerns of the convention and the developmental needs of the States parties. States parties to the convention should be seen to be deriving benefits denied to non-States parties.

My delegation is still concerned that the proposed restriction of certain chemicals would adversely affect a wide range of industries in the chemical field, because of their heavy dependence on the importation of raw materials, including chemical agents. Indeed, it could result in supplies being hampered, creating protracted delays and the resultant escalation in their prices. We believe that the existing export control measures in the chemical industry should be abolished when the convention enters into force. Article XI of the convention should be credible and devoid of any loopholes that could be exploited to the disadvantage of States parties. We should avoid such measures that would weaken the provisions of this article, bearing in mind the potential benefits. The convention should not be seen as creating a split regime in any article, rather it should help to foster international cooperation in the field of chemical activities amongst States parties.

The success of any disarmament agreement depends on the level of confidence the States parties have that others are fulfilling their obligations. Verification primarily performs this function. Verification is not an end in itself, but an essential element in the process of achieving arms limitation and disarmament agreements. The verification arrangements and procedures for the future chemical weapons convention should be fair, equitable, non-discriminatory and must not be unduly intrusive. It must not jeopardize the economic, technological and social development of States parties.

We are, however, concerned at the current attempts to create a more stringent verification regime for schedule 3 production facilities than their schedule 2 counterparts. The schedule 2 chemicals pose a greater risk to the convention than the schedule 3 chemicals. Thus, it seems logical to maintain

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a tighter control on chemicals in terms of their recognized risk to the convention. This should subsequently be reflected in the required threshold for inspection.

While the conduct of routine inspection should be left to the technical secretariat, we believe that challenge inspection is, however, qualitatively different, since it is initiated by a State party, and intended to address some specific doubts and concerns. This gives it a political and sensitive character which has made the negotiation of article IX rather difficult. Obviously, the image of a State party, the challenged State, will be at stake. My delegation feels that the inspection procedure should be a collective exercise from the beginning to the end. Hence, the executive council should be involved in decision-making both before and after the inspection. Adequate measures, however, must be taken to discourage frivolous and abusive requests from States parties.

Nigeria believes that the executive council should play an important role in the implementation of the future chemical weapons convention. In this regard, we support the principle of equitable geographical distribution and the importance of chemical industry in allocating regional as well as global seats in this body. We note with satisfaction the current efforts of Friend of the Chair Ambassador Tóth of Hungary in finding a common formula. My Delegation earlier indicated its preference for the first of the two options as contained in his non-paper of yesterday. Whatever criteria applicable should be universal.

The issue of financing the organization is equally important. Without adequate funds, the implementation of the convention will be in jeopardy. We believe that every State party should contribute to the running of the organization. However, any scale of assessment devised should reflect the specific nature of the convention, bearing in mind the chemical industry capacity of States parties.

As we look forward to the early conclusion of the chemical weapons convention, the threat posed by nuclear weapons continues to loom large in our minds. The issue of a nuclear test ban and indeed nuclear disarmament remain priority items on our agenda. Nigeria has always expressed the view that the acquisition of nuclear weapons cannot guarantee genuine international peace and security. Thus, we have consistently called for urgent and concrete measures towards nuclear disarmament. My delegation welcomes the decision by France to suspend nuclear weapons testing in 1992 and to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. We also welcome the recent signing of the Protocol to the START Treaty in Lisbon by the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. However, we believe that unilateral and bilateral initiatives only complement multilateral efforts. The Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament has the responsibility of initiating negotiations on a nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

My delegation is disappointed that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has not been re-established due to lack of agreement on an appropriate mandate. We must not allow the golden opportunity provided by the recent initiatives on the reduction of nuclear arms to elude us. The post-cold-war era has created a favourable political environment for the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee with a negotiating mandate.

The world is in need of an effective international agreement that bans nuclear weapon testing in all environments for all time. The international community must take necessary measures to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. A comprehensive test ban will be the first step in this direction. This would strengthen the present non-proliferation regime and ensure universal adherence.

The CD, reflecting the current changes in the international political system, decided recently to include a new item, "Transparency in armaments", in its agenda. My delegation fully supports this decision and will make its own contribution to the deliberations on this item. We believe that transparency and openness in armaments could enhance confidence-building among member States, thereby strengthening regional and international peace and security. However, the item has to be considered in a comprehensive manner in order to achieve its objectives. The production, stockpiling, accumulation and transfer of arms should all be given equal and adequate attention.

In conclusion, the Conference on Disarmament must confront its approved programme of work and adopt a more realistic, flexible and rewarding approach to accomplishing it. We must set our house in order by being responsive to the aspirations of mankind. We now have an unprecedented opportunity to advance towards the objectives of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ambassador Sir Michael Weston.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, I must, at the outset, join you in welcoming Her Excellency the State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, and express appreciation for the statement she has just made.

Today I should like to make a statement on behalf of the Western Group on agenda items 2 and 3. The Western Group welcomes discussions in the Conference on Disarmament on nuclear disarmament because we believe that such discussions play a positive role in strengthening international security and stability in the nuclear age. It remains the view of the Western Group that the prevention of nuclear war can only be dealt with satisfactorily in the broader context of the prevention of war in general.

Peace and security can be achieved only through full observance of the principles set out in the Charter of the United Nations and of other relevant obligations under international law. The maintenance and enhancement of

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

international security depend on responsible behaviour in relations between States. Such behaviour should strictly abide by the provisions contained in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter, as well as other relevant obligations. However, the responsible conduct of States in maintaining international and national security requires more than just refraining from aggression. States should also demonstrate respect for international peace and security by engaging in measures of arms control, arms reduction and confidence-building.

In the field of arms control and disarmament, nuclear disarmament remains one of our highest priorities. Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, all must be actively involved and contribute to measures of disarmament and arms limitation. It is a matter of necessity for all to make progress in this field.

Nuclear proliferation is one of the greatest threats to worldwide security and stability. The further proliferation of nuclear weapons would affect the security of all States. Thus, nuclear disarmament and the questions of non-proliferation of nuclear arms, particularly following the political changes of the last 12 months, represent one of the most serious challenges, and demand the attention and commitment of all members of the CD.

The last 18 months have seen some positive steps in the process of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. First, the satisfactory implementation of the INF Treaty, which achieved in 1991 the elimination of a whole class of nuclear weapons. This is an important factor of increased stability.

Second, the conclusion of the START Treaty and the subsequent initiatives of Presidents Bush and Yeltsin. We welcome the recent progress made by the United States and Russia towards further reductions in their nuclear arsenals and we wish to encourage efforts in this direction. We also welcome the recent signing in Lisbon of the protocol to the START Treaty signed by the United States, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia which will allow for the entry into force of the START Treaty.

Third, since the world situation has improved the United States is not building any nuclear weapons nor manufacturing plutonium or weapons-grade uranium for weapon production purposes for the first time since 1945.

Fourth, the unilateral decisions taken by the United States and the former USSR to eliminate all land-based short-range nuclear weapons. We express the hope that the implementation of these measures will take place in the best possible conditions of security and transparency. These initiatives should lead to further far-reaching steps in order to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible levels of forces.

Fifth, negotiations on defence and space issues, including the relationship between means of strategic offence and defence, have taken place between the United States and the former USSR. We strongly support the continuation of these negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation.

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

The other nuclear Powers who are members of the Western Group have also made meaningful contributions to the process of nuclear disarmament by making reductions in some of their nuclear weapon programmes.

We welcome recent initiatives in southern Africa, in particular the accession of South Africa, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Zambia to the NPT and the safeguards agreements with IAEA, as well as the moves towards the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Council of Ministers of OAU at its fifty-fourth ordinary session held in Abuja in May-June 1991.

We welcome major and positive initiatives in Latin America such as the "Mendoza Declaration", the "Cartagena Declaration", commitments entered into by Argentina and Brazil establishing full-scope safeguards regimes with IAEA and to take steps to bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force, and the French decision to ratify Additional Protocol I of the Tlatelolco Treaty.

With regard to the Korean peninsula, we welcome the entry into force of the safeguards agreement with IAEA by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and look forward to an early implementation of the agreement to allow IAEA to carry out fully its responsibilities on all nuclear facilities in the country as was announced by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We also encourage further development in the bilateral arrangements between North and South Korea regarding mutual inspections.

Each of these steps is a major contribution towards substantial reductions in the global level of nuclear weapons, leading on towards our shared, ultimate goal of global nuclear disarmament.

While the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament rests with those States which possess the most important arsenals, the international community as a whole must be actively involved and contribute to measures of nuclear disarmament and arms limitations and to non-proliferation. Our common wish is to see the achievement of further such substantial reductions and a reinforcement of existing barriers to nuclear weapon proliferation.

The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones can contribute to stability in the regions concerned, to non-proliferation, to the disarmament process in general as well as to international peace and security, provided all States concerned are prepared to cooperate on the basis of freely concluded agreements with appropriate verification measures and in conformity with internationally agreed principles.

We support efforts to make progress in disarmament in the Middle East. To this end we call on all States in the region to adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty and to place all of their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. In this context, we recall our support for the initiative of President Mubarak to make the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

The International Peace Conference on the Middle East offers interested parties the possibilities of a direct dialogue, which is also an appropriate manner of furthering disarmament in the Middle East. We reiterate our commitment to play a constructive and active role in those multilateral negotiations.

We reaffirm our strong commitment to nuclear non-proliferation in general, and the NPT in particular as a cornerstone of the international regime of nuclear non-proliferation. We welcome the accession of more States to the NPT. With the accessions of France and China, all the permanent members of the Security Council will have become parties to the NPT, thus further strengthening the Treaty's universality. We urge again all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty.

We consider it essential that all new States of the former Soviet Union uphold their commitments. We reiterate the importance we attach to single control of nuclear weapons and to the effective control of nuclear exports from these republics. We expect that Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine will accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States.

We welcome the establishment of a Science and Technology Centre in Russia which will contribute both to disarmament and to non-proliferation objectives. Members of the Western Group have already made clear that they will extend substantial support to the Centre and others have indicated intentions to do so as well and look forward to cooperating with the other States involved to assure its success.

We consider that in parallel with wider adherence to the NPT, and in view of recent events, a further strengthening and improvement of safeguards implementation are desirable, as well as of nuclear export controls. We support proposals recently made to this end.

We welcome the progress made by IAEA in its efforts towards strengthening the Agency's safeguards systems. We hope that these efforts will be supported by all members.

The Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime are key instruments for the control of transfers of sensitive nuclear and missile materials, technology and equipment. We welcome recent decisions of the NSG to control exports of nuclear-related dual-use items and to require full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply. We recognize the legitimate interest of the international community in the transfer of high technology for civil purposes and wish that discussion and cooperation will continue in this field.

It is important that this Conference continues to keep abreast of all disarmament initiatives and in particular encourages the process of nuclear disarmament. The Western Group welcomes recent progress and will continue to work towards the objective of achieving lasting international peace and security.

Mr. ALMUSAWI (Iraq) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, allow me to begin my statement by stating how pleased I am to have the honour of addressing you in this distinguished body. I wish you every success during your term as President of the Conference. May I at the same time state our great appreciation for the sincere efforts made in this forum to attain its noble objectives?

During the past few years, the life of the international community has been characterized by such interdependence that it has become necessary for all States to participate in the common endeavour of mankind in conformity with international law and without any dual interpretation of that law. The most pressing need is that of building a world in which war would no longer be a means of settling problems, a world where there would be no threat of annihilation, where peace, justice and equity would reign, as would criteria that would bring equality to all peoples and nations of our planet. Realization of this high objective must be brought about, inter alia, through the adoption of disarmament measures that are just and balanced and can safeguard the right of every State to security without any country or group of countries obtaining privileges at any stage. On the basis of this view, as contained in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, Iraq has participated in the work of the Conference on Disarmament as an observer since 1989, and it is drawing on that view that we have advocated expansion of the Conference on Disarmament to include all countries which so wish.

This year the work of the Conference on Disarmament is moving actively towards concluding a convention on a chemical weapons ban. While we appreciate most sincerely the efforts being carried out here to conclude the convention, we and many other peoples of the world hope to see a convention which will rid our planet of all chemical weapons without exception. The accession by all countries to this key convention, its objective and rigorous implementation and the non-inclusion of any measure that would impede scientific progress in developing countries or constitute a means of intervening in their domestic affairs are among the elements for its success. Furthermore, universal accession to the convention and its equal application to all countries, large or small, are exceptionally important to ensuring that no State party finds itself at the mercy of a State that is not party to the convention or another State party which fails to implement its terms.

Furthermore, despite the extreme importance attributed by the international community to a chemical weapons ban, this question should not be the sole focus of attention from this unique multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. Progress should be made in other areas, particularly those falling within the competence of the ad hoc committees on nuclear weapons, given the maximum priority that the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly attributed to effective measures for nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war.

(Mr. Almusawi, Iraq)

The decades that have passed since the establishment of this negotiating forum without effective measures having been taken on the items relating to nuclear disarmament are lost decades. However, hope remains that the ad hoc committees on nuclear weapons will be given appropriate mandates allowing them to embark on negotiations on halting the nuclear arms race, on a nuclear test ban, and on nuclear disarmament.

We welcome the bilateral efforts aimed at limiting certain categories of nuclear weapons, but they can never replace multilateral efforts in an area which is so important for the future of mankind as a whole. For this reason, bilateral and multilateral efforts should be complementary and should facilitate each other. The Conference on Disarmament must play an active role in this respect.

Although the majority of the world's countries attach importance to international efforts on nuclear disarmament, this is a matter of exceptional importance to our Arab region due to its inherent instability, which stems from Israel's possession of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, its occupation of the territories of more than one Arab State and its refusal to acknowledge the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, first and foremost among these being its right to self-determination and to establish an independent State on its national soil.

Because of its refusal to accept foreign domination and hegemony, my country has for some time been the target of an unjust campaign which assumes various pretexts. The campaign reached its height in the use by the United States and its allies of armed force against my country on the pretext of implementing Security Council resolution 678 (1990). However, many facts have revealed that the true goal of the aggression against my country was to destroy its life and economic infrastructure. In this respect, I must quote Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, the envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who said in his report on his visit to Iraq from 10 to 17 March 1991 that the recent conflict had wrought near-apocalyptic results on the economic infrastructure of Iraq. In this brutal military aggression, the bombs dropped on my country were equivalent to seven of the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima. The United States and the United Kingdom also used various weapons which are banned internationally, including depleted-uranium (U-238) bombs containing toxic chemicals and radioactive materials which threaten to cause large-scale human and environmental disaster.

Following this organized destruction of Iraq's basic infrastructure and the means of its civilian life, Security Council resolution 687 was adopted on 30 April 1992, under the title of the "cease-fire resolution". This resolution imposed measures and conditions on Iraq that are unprecedented in the history of this international organization. I will not dwell on the details of its provisions, which are not within the direct concern of this forum. I will, however, specifically address the measures provided for in

(Mr. Almusawi, Iraq)

section C of resolution 687, which deals with disarmament and verification procedures. You are no doubt aware that this section of the resolution in particular flagrantly employs double standards in dealing with the subject of arms in our region, since Iraq alone has been obliged to destroy the remainder of its non-conventional weapons, whereas other States in the region, notably Israel, continue to possess such weapons. The Security Council has overlooked the fact that Israel is the only State in the region which was asked by the Security Council in resolution 487 (1981) to place all its nuclear facilities under international control.

Iraq agreed to implement resolution 687 and today, one year after the implementation of that resolution, I think it useful to highlight in this Conference some of the lessons drawn from the implementation of the provisions of the resolution on weapons.

The Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have carried out 37 inspection missions involving nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles, and Iraq has cooperated with the team of inspectors in the context of their mission, as stated in detail in the letter from the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Iraq to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the Security Council dated 23 January 1992, yet despite this, certain influential States in the Security Council, particularly the United States and Great Britain, continue to cast doubt on the position of Iraq. Obviously, there are many reasons for maintaining this atmosphere of suspicion, including the wish to justify the criminal acts perpetrated during the military operations against Iraq outside the framework of resolution 678, and the wish to use the suspicion as a pretext to maintain the economic blockade imposed on the Iraqi people and to benefit from the powers and immunities extended to the inspection team with a view to interfering in the domestic affairs of my country. I regret that I must state most bitterly in this forum that measures for arms limitation and verification have come to be used as a tool in the hands of the influential States for perpetuating their suspect policies, without the slightest regard for the principles that should govern the action of the United Nations, such as objectivity, neutrality, integrity, professionalism and scrupulous commitment to the provisions of the Charter and international law.

The Americans, for example, foisted the largest possible number of their inspectors onto the inspection teams; they accounted for more than 50 per cent of the members of some nuclear inspection teams. It is logical to believe that some of them did not come to carry out the mission entrusted to them by the United Nations, but rather to serve the political purposes of the United States. For instance, David Kay, an intelligence officer, was conveying the information gathered from Baghdad directly to Washington. On 30 October 1991, Mr. Ekeus himself conceded that Washington had received information from David Kay on Iraqi documentation before it was received by the United Nations. Here I should perhaps mention remarks published on 22 October 1991 in the French newspaper Libération which were made by a French expert who was a member of the United Nations inspection teams in

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Iraq. Referring to his American colleagues, he said that "they are apparently United States intelligence agents who are working for the CIA, and not for the United Nations". The French expert also stated that the American inspectors deliberately attempted to create confrontation with the Iraqi side, and even hoped that a mission member would die in order to justify United States intervention.

It was noted that some of the Special Commission inspection teams were intent on acquiring information and scientific, technical and administrative reports that bore no relationship to the mandate of the Special Commission or the resolutions of the Security Council, thus confirming that some members of the inspection teams were endeavouring to obtain intelligence information for their own countries for suspect political purposes of which everyone is now aware. Moreover, the fact that certain inspection teams entered sites that had nothing to do with the inspection, such as prisons, sports grounds and educational institutions, reflects the premeditated desire to provoke Iraq and thus create an artificial crisis. Some inspection teams also entered the headquarters of regional and international organizations in Iraq, disregarding the immunities extended to such premises.

Furthermore, overflights of Iraqi territory by United States U-2 spy-planes on the pretext of conducting aerial surveys for the Commission have recently reached an average of one overflight every 48 hours, lasting three to five hours, which clearly indicates that the primary beneficiary of the information and photographs collected by such aircraft is the United States and not the United Nations. It also indicates that the aircraft were originally used for American purposes which were continued through the United Nations.

The failure of the inspection team members to respect the confidential nature of the information gathered was such that on 5 December 1991, one such member, Mr. Leslie Thorn, extended invitations to an open lecture to be held in a restaurant at the United Nations offices in Vienna, where he was to talk about the tasks of the inspection teams in Iraq.

The examples I have cited are merely a drop in the ocean as far as the practices of some inspection team members are concerned; they reflect the methods used by certain influential countries to exploit the measures provided for under Security Council resolutions with respect to procedures for arms limitation and verification. These methods show one aspect of how these countries handle and interpret international measures. However, there is another aspect, no less excessive, which is that the campaign aimed at casting doubt on Iraq's position with respect to weapons and the artificial turmoil created by some inspection team members were exploited to obtain new Security Council resolutions containing more extremist provisions than those included in resolution 687; they now went beyond arms limitation to deprive our people of a free and dignified life and deny our country its industrial base.

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All the interpretations, allegations and concoctions with respect to the Iraqi arms programme are either false, fabricated or exaggerated. The Government of Iraq has already affirmed, and reaffirms, that Iraq has never sought to possess nuclear weapons and that its political leadership has at no time adopted a decision to channel research being carried out by the Iraqi scientists who specialize in nuclear energy towards the manufacture of any type of nuclear weapon.

While pointing out the serious and deliberate transgressions that took place under the cover of implementation of Security Council resolutions on arms limitation and the arbitrary action that accompanied their implementation, we hope that the lessons learned from this period will help to overcome the arbitrariness, narrow-minded self-interest and pre-set political goals which some States apply in implementing the international resolutions on weapons, irrespective of the forum in which such resolutions were adopted and irrespective of the mechanism for implementation.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): We have heard the statement made by the representative of Iraq, and I am grateful to him for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Sir Michael Weston.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): I am sorry to take the floor again and I certainly do not want to waste the Conference's time by responding at length to the rubbish to which we have just listened. I really wonder, however, if this Conference has ever had to listen to such a catalogue of lies and hypocrisy.

At the beginning of the representative of Iraq's statement I was quite touched, almost moved to tears indeed, by the concern which he was showing for the people of the Middle East and for the stability of the area. And I agree with him that there are very special reasons why Iraq should be involved in any negotiations on chemical weapons. I might suggest to him that there are reasons other than the desire of the Western countries to perpetuate their hegemony over Iraq why it is that the Security Council has taken the measures it has taken against his country. The suggestion that the use of armed force against Iraq was on the pretext of anything is totally rejected by my delegation. It was to put an end to an unprovoked act of aggression against a small neighbouring State, and as far as my delegation is concerned we are proud of what we did.

I am also quite amazed to listen to what the Iraqi representative says about the effect on the environment of the actions of the coalition forces. I can only suggest that he should go to Kuwait and see the effect on the environment there of what has been done, which has been brought about by the action of the Iraqis, where they have turned the desert into sea, a sea of oil, and where for a while they turned day into night.

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

I see absolutely no reason for the United Kingdom to have to cast doubt on the position of Iraq. It seems to me that there is no doubt and that the position of Iraq with regard to chemical and nuclear weapons is absolutely clear. It is a totally irresponsible attitude, and nothing which the Iraqi representative says will convince us otherwise. I would also reject the suggestion that the reason for the maintenance of the "blockade" against Iraq is anything but Iraq's failure to accept the United Nations Security Council resolutions.

I am sure we were all touched by his concern for the Iraqi people. It is surprising that there are any Iraqis left after the actions taken against them by his Government using any weapon to hand, including chemical weapons.

I am sorry to speak with such emotion, but frankly I cannot conceal my fury at the hypocrisy of the Iraqi representative and of his Government.

Mr. BRECKON (United States of America): Let me support in every respect the statement just made by our distinguished colleague, the representative of the United Kingdom. We have all had to listen this morning to a self-serving, defensive and quite fanciful account of activities of representatives of the United Nations in carrying out decisions of the international community made with unprecedented unity of purpose. The allegations we have heard this morning are, of course, quite inappropriate for this forum. But since my country has been accused repeatedly by name, I am forced to take the floor to reject the accusations categorically. It is quite unnecessary to refute each one of these allegations because the activities and the findings of the United Nations Special Commission in Iraq are well known in this room. The work of the dedicated personnel of the inspection teams, what they found, the obstacles they have had to encounter and overcome are particularly well known, and the remarks of the representative of Iraq will be judged correctly for what they are by everyone in this room.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank Mr. Breckon for his statement. The representative of Iraq has asked me for the floor once again. I would like to remind him that we are in a negotiating body and not a deliberative body and I would therefore be grateful in giving him the floor if he would be brief in his statement.

Mr. ALMUSAWI (Iraq) (translated from Arabic): I will start with your remark, Mr. President, and say that I very much appreciate your view that we are in a negotiating forum where everyone expresses his or her opinion and leaves it to others to draw their own conclusions.

I regret the words used by the representative of the United Kingdom and find them inappropriate to this negotiating forum. I see no reason for his surfeit of anger unless he really believes that his country and the coalition forces exceeded the mandate specified under resolution 687 and began systematically to destroy Iraq under the veil of international legitimacy. My statement merely spoke of the fear that arms limitation and control measures would come to be used as a weapon by certain States to interfere in the

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domestic affairs of other countries. I think this is one of the basic concerns preoccupying all delegations to the Conference on Disarmament and all those interested in the questions of international peace and security, transparency and so on. It was therefore logical for me to articulate our experience and he may articulate his own. However, I regret the words used and the allegations that Iraq used chemical weapons; I think this is a tune which is now well worn. He can tell me which forbidden weapons were used by the coalition forces against my country, against peace-lovers and against safe refugees. They include the depleted uranium to which I referred in my statement.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): We have taken note of your comments. I now give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador Errera.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): I would like to add my voice to what was said by the representative of the United Kingdom and by the representative of the United States. And in so far as, in an oblique manner, my country, in the shape of a French expert who was quoted on many occasions in a press cutting, was cited in the statements by the representative of Iraq, whose thrust was to extend to France what he said about the United Kingdom and the United States, with whom we feel complete solidarity, I would just like to say this. Extremely serious accusations have been made, as well as statements that are totally groundless in disregard of the most elementary respect for the actual facts. The first fact is the origin of the decisions taken by the United Nations Security Council, that is, Iraq's invasion of the sovereign State of Kuwait. The second fact, among others, is the violation by Iraq of its commitments vis-à-vis the International Atomic Energy Agency, a violation established and condemned by the IAEA Board of Governors in September 1991. Is there any need to remind you that all the decisions of the United Nations Security Council, starting with resolution 687, were adopted often unanimously, mostly with a very large majority, and were adopted in strict conformity with the responsibilities and rules of the supreme body of the international community - the same international community which, also by an overwhelming majority and repeatedly, has expressed its condemnation of Iraq's action?

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I have no more speakers on the list for today. Does any other delegation wish to speak? If not, the secretariat has, as usual, circulated today the timetable of meetings to be held during the coming week, in other words between 15 and 19 June. You will see that the timetable does not reflect meetings that may be held in the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The activities of that subsidiary body are at present taking place in informal consultations, and so it is difficult to foresee the various meetings. That is why all that is indicated are the meetings the Committee will hold on Monday, 15 June at 5 p.m. and on 18 June at 3 p.m., and as you will see, a series of meetings on Monday morning, Tuesday morning and afternoon and Wednesday afternoon have been left open. In consultation with the secretariat I felt it would be

(The President)

appropriate to concentrate the other meetings of the Conference on Thursday and Friday as far as possible, in order to facilitate the meetings being held on the draft convention on chemical weapons, which must continue in their present form until Wednesday, 17 June. As always, the timetable is merely indicative and if necessary, we will amend it as circumstances dictate. If there are no objections I will take it that the Conference adopts this tentative timetable of meetings for the coming week.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): As you will remember, during our last plenary we decided to cancel all tomorrow's meetings except for this plenary. Consequently, the informal meeting on the substance of item 2 of the agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", which was to be held tomorrow, will be held, as the timetable indicates, after our plenary meeting on Thursday, 18 June.

I have no other items to take up, and so, unless any delegation wishes to speak, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 18 June at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.